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Before your interview for Avant, you have written: "I recently did a lot of work 
in cognitive science research which explicitly crosses over between phe-
nomenology and dynamics, and in some sense this can be seen as a continua-
tion of Hume's specific project to establish a foundational science of man". 
Would you agree that one of the determinants of an unprejudiced approach to 
traditional philosophy is… an enthusiasm? 
I think that cultivating an awareness of our past is an essential aspect of managing 
our future, and this is especially the case if we are interested in shaping the future of 
the sciences of the mind. In this regard we should not forget that Hume himself, of 
course, was also an enthusiastic scholar and famous historian. However, I would not 
say that this enthusiasm gives rise to an ‘unprejudiced approach’ as such; we should 
not forget the critical lessons of postmodernism. At the same time it is certainly true 
that each of the great traditional philosophers had somewhat different prejudices than 
we have now, and therefore reading their works presents us with an opportunity to 
reevaluate our own positions from a rather fresh perspective. And in many cases we 
will find that their traditional perspective is still implicitly determining aspects of our 
modern discourse, although this role will have been more or less covered by subse-
quent historical sedimentation. 
Going back to these original sources and making their ongoing relevance explicit is 
an important task of modern philosophy. It can show us how the fundamental prob-
lems we are trying to solve today, whether by means of scientific experimentation, 
philosophical analysis, or phenomenological reflection, are not absolutely indepen-
dent from our background. On the contrary, the problems gain their significance and 
status as problems from the context of understanding and practice in which they are 
embedded, and we should not be drawn into resolving a problem unless we agree 88 AVANT  Volume II, Number 1/2011   www.avant.edu.pl
with the premises that define it as such. 
In order to illustrate this point consider, for 
example, a typical response by computation-
alists to my critique of traditional artificial in-
telligence (see Froese and Ziemke 2009). 
They disagree with my critical analysis be-
cause,   for   instance,   the   famous   ‘symbol 
grounding’ problem can now, so I am told, be 
solved. But this response misunderstands 
the deeper message of the paper: I suggest 
that the whole framework in which the ‘sym-
bol grounding’ problem is originally formulat-
ed, and perhaps resolved, namely a repre-
sentational theory of mind, is simply inade-
quate and misguided. In other words, such 
paradigmatic problems do  not get solved 
during a paradigm shift; they cease to be 
problems altogether. And, of course, this kind 
of profound change in thought and practice, 
which always involves an uneasy and yet enticing movement toward as of yet un-
charted territory, cannot be accomplished without a fair share of personal enthusi-
asm. 
In your paper on Hume you show the potential of Hume’s ‘science of man’, 
which could be re-evaluated in terms of today’s cognitive science. What does 
Hume’s philosophy of mind mean to your own philosophical investigations?
Hume’s philosophy of mind is a very rich source of inspiration. Actually, I had one of 
my first big moments of philosophical awakening while contemplating the depths of 
Schopenhauer’s metaphysics, which was of course also inspired by Hume to a signi-
ficant extent. And it was primarily in relation to Hume’s empiricist and phenomenolo-
gical philosophy that I began to systematically study and to understand the constella-
tion of modern philosophy during my doctoral studies. When I recently reread Gilles 
Deleuze’s (1953) excellent book on Hume in preparation for this interview, I realized 
once more how much we can still learn from Hume’s philosophy and how radical it 
really was. Let me highlight two examples here (see also Froese 2009), which could 
have immense consequences in cognitive science and beyond.
One of the most important things we can learn from Hume, and which motivates his 
entire theory of mind, is that rationalism, when pushed to its logical conclusion, can-
not account for human action. Hume had the profound insight that reason alone can 
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tion. Choosing one course of action over another is not a question of logic, but of 
value, and hence of ethics:
Where a passion is neither founded on false suppositions, nor chooses 
means insufficient for the end, the understanding can neither justify nor 
condemn it. ‘Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the 
whole world to the scratching of my finger. (Hume, Treatise 2.3.3.6)
We can find a more elaborate version of this critique of reason in Derrida’s decon-
struction of the decision. He argues that the outcome of a choice cannot be rationally 
determined in an a priori manner, because otherwise it was never a choice in the first 
place and there would be no sense of assigning responsibility for the outcome. Mod-
ern cognitive science has tried to avoid facing up to the full implications of Hume’s 
fact-value (and reason-action) gap, which still haunts ethics today, by turning values 
into facts and reason into mechanism. This is, of course, the essence of the compu-
tational theory of mind. And yet Hume prevails again: the same fundamental issues 
make an appearance in the failure of traditional artificial intelligence to design a robot 
capable of effective action (the famous ‘frame problem’). 
This brings me to the second point I want to highlight here, namely what we can learn 
from the way in which Hume tries to deal with this problem. He tried to devise a new 
foundation for philosophy, science and practical life, which charts a transient middle 
way between two stable and yet flawed attractors: reductionist materialism and tran-
scendental idealism. I agree with Deleuze that Hume’s philosophy of mind should be 
applauded for sketching out a theory of how self and subjectivity can constitute itself 
inside what is given to the mind, where the given is essentially identical with mind as 
such. This is a truly radical proposal. And although there is some movement in this di-
rection within the enactive approach to cognitive science, as expressed, for instance, 
in   terms   of   a   growing   appreciation   of   the   foundational   importance   of   the 
phenomenology of the lived body, these are only tentative beginnings. I am con-
vinced, as Hume probably would have been, that the enactive approach to naturaliz-
ing phenomenology will eventually have to be complemented by a more serious phe-
nomenologizing of nature.
We really appreciate your way of looking at Hume, that is without Kantian 
“glasses” which are so often put on by Hume’s researchers. Have you ever felt 
any objections against misinterpretations of other philosophers’ thoughts?
The proper interpretation of a great philosopher’s work will always be controversial, 
and it is highly questionable to what extent we can actually ever claim to have found 
the definitive interpretation. This is especially so with Hume, whose work has been in-
terpreted and used to defend pretty much any position in modern philosophy. I myself 
am also somewhat guilty of this, as I have tried to understand Hume’s work from 
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scendental phenomenology. But I finally settled on the current interpretation by refer-
ring to the perspective of Deleuze and the enactive approach to cognitive science 
(which also share a certain affinity, see Protevi 2010). I think that this interpretation is 
more viable than others, especially because they are coherent with a wider range of 
Hume’s texts. The particular interpretation to which I felt most strongly opposed was 
the one proposed by Jerry Fodor (2003), who attempted to make a case for the com-
putational theory of mind by focusing on one narrow aspect of Hume’s philosophy of 
mind, namely the Theory of Ideas. Of course, as should be clear from what I have 
said in response to the previous question, I think that Fodor is making a fundamental 
mistake.
What, in your opinion, Hume would do, that Husserl wouldn’t? I am asking 
about the limits of the phenomenological investigation, which was a domain of 
them both.
In order to answer this question I think we need to be careful to distinguish between 
the different phases of Husserl’s work, which gave rise to distinct forms of phe-
nomenology. If we consider some of Husserl’s mid-stage research, then we find him 
applauding Hume for being the first to discover the phenomenological problem of 
constitution. But at the same time he would criticize Hume for not taking this discov-
ery further into a transcendental direction. On the other hand, it is precisely on this 
point that Deleuze defends Hume against such a classical transcendental phe-
nomenology, and commends his account of subjectivity and the process of constitu-
tion for staying within the domain of the given. In this regard I think that Hume would 
be much more open to a mutually informing exchange with enactive cognitive sci-
ence, than would Husserl at this point in his career. But we should also not forget 
Husserl’s later turn to the phenomenology of the life world, which situated the subject 
inside the given in a way that is much more reminiscent to Hume’s project. It would 
be an interesting study to evaluate more precisely how the phenomenology of the 
later Husserl compares with Hume’s work.
According to Hume’s ‘interactive’ style of writing (he often communicates with 
the reader by asking him/her to confirm his claims within their own experience) 
what kind of skills could be trained or even gained with this practice, which 
would help in better understanding ourselves and the world?
This is a very interesting question that again nicely highlights Hume’s continuing rel-
evance to today’s philosophy and science of mind. In fact, I believe that the develop-
ment of the enactive approach to cognitive science, and of consciousness science 
more generally, will eventually force us to communicate in a way that is much more 
akin to Hume’s interactive style. At the moment there are whole fields within cognitive 
science that are devoted to explaining certain assumed phenomena, although a care-
ful and systematic examination of one’s own experience can reveal these assump-
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Take for instance the popular problem of other minds, according to which we per-
ceive others as opaque material objects and whose status as others we only know 
through logical inference. But, as Hume would say, can you confirm this in your own 
experience? Please try this out for yourself: engage with another person and become 
aware of how you experience the other, not by abstracting but rather by more fully 
entering into the situation. Normally you should find that you encounter the other 
person as another person even before you can focus on some of their isolated 
physical properties. And note that this confirmation or refutation is not a matter of 
rational argument. It is a matter of a practical phenomenological inquiry. We have 
already discussed how reason alone cannot determine our actions. Here we see that 
reason by itself cannot determine our perceptions, either. No amount of reasoning 
alone can force any conclusion about what it is like to have any kind of experience. 
We have to generate the conditions for the appearance of the experience and then 
live through it. 
I think that this is another nice example of how the enactive approach is following in 
Hume’s footsteps and at the same time pushing his insights further. For example, you 
can find the interactive style of communication in Varela’s adoption of Hans Jonas’ 
existentialist appeal to our own felt concern for the teleological foundations of a bio-
phenomenology (e.g. Weber and Varela 2002). In addition, the consequences of this 
kind of interactive style are also evident in Varela’s promotion of a pragmatic engage-
ment with phenomenological inquiry (e.g. Depraz, et al. 2003). In my own research 
I have developed this interactive style in a new direction by trying to design easily ac-
cessible technological interfaces, which could potentially facilitate the debate about 
the phenomenology of active perception (see Froese and Spiers 2007). What these 
developments show is that, like Hume foresaw, a proper science of the mind cannot 
be separated from praxis and experience.
In your text you defend enactivism against idealism (for which Hume is also ac-
cused). In the work of Pascal and O’Regan (2008) though, autopoietic enac-
tivism of Varela is named to be idealist. How would you comment on that? 
I disagree with the interpretation given by Pascal and O’Regan, but at least their 
commentary has the value of giving an explicit voice to a common misunderstanding 
of the enactive approach, especially of Varela’s neuro-phenomenology method, and 
by extension also of phenomenology more generally. An assessment of this misinter-
pretation takes us back to what we already discussed in response to the first ques-
tion about problems and their context of validity. Although at first sight Pascal and 
O’Regan appear to be defending some version of a materialist monism, their misin-
terpretation (and others of a similar kind) has nicely revealed how deeply dualistic the 
modern scientific context of understanding still is, even despite the popular dis-
avowals to the contrary. Let us briefly consider what enables us to draw this implicit 
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The enactive approach rejects the standard materialist view, according to which the 
mind is nothing but brain activity, and argues that we should accept the existence of 
experience (and the experience of existence) as something to be explained in its own 
right. Now, for someone who is situated within a dualistic framework of understand-
ing, the rejection of materialism can only entail its opposite, namely idealism. But this 
reversal simply misses the point that the enactive approach has shifted the entire 
frame of research into a different domain, namely as situated within our immediate 
and concrete lived experience. In other words, it has not chosen to defend the other 
side of the mind-body dualism, but has replaced the context in which the mind-body 
problem was originally formulated. Mental events and brain events are not seen as 
two independent substances, but rather as two aspects that can be distinguished and 
abstracted from within a more general situation of being in the world. This lived situa-
tion of being in the world is not some magical realm of ideal mental forms, but rather 
the situation in which we always already find ourselves engaged in, even before we 
engage in any kind of theoretical reflection. This is a kind of existential phenomenolo-
gy, to be sure, but it is not idealism if by idealism we understand a reduction to a tran-
scendental subject. 
In your article there can be found only a brief note about the distinction be-
tween personal and subpersonal processes in Hume’s philosophy. Don’t you 
think that this distinction is not clearly stressed in works on enactivism?
The distinction between personal and subpersonal processes is as important as it is 
difficult. It is not always clear what is meant by the terms, which adds further confu-
sion. If all that is meant is a distinction between a person conceived as a whole sys-
tem and a person conceived in terms of a system of components, then I think that 
both Hume and the enactive approach make this relatively clear. In fact, Maturana 
and Varela have given us a workable operational definition of a systemic whole with 
their notion of autopoiesis. 
However, the personal / subpersonal distinction becomes much more complicated as 
soon as we introduce phenomenological considerations. It is easy enough to identify 
the personal level with the psychological level in phenomenology. But what about the 
pre-reflective level in phenomenology, for instance Husserl’s analysis of inner time 
consciousness? Should this be considered sub-personal because it is prior to the 
constitution of an ego? Or should we reserve the term sub-personal only for distinc-
tions made by the natural sciences in the local ontology of material objects? The lat-
ter option conforms more closely to the current usage of the term in cognitive sci-
ence, but there is also a growing need for a better recognition of the subpersonal lev-
el in our analysis of lived experience. Otherwise we have the problem that a phe-
nomenology of the pre-reflective level, although it does not directly involve a cogni-
tive subject, is easily misunderstood as some kind of psychologism or idealism. In 
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which are unconscious in the sense that they are experiences that are not being re-
flected upon, and unconscious physical events, which are unconscious in the sense 
that they are not experiences in the first place.
And then we should also not forget that we can distinguish a level of intersubjectively 
shared processes as well. During social interactions we experience a shared situa-
tion of being with other persons, i.e. a second-person perspective, and the dynamics 
of these interactions place novel conditions and constraints on the behavior of the in-
dividuals. Since these phenomena cannot be reduced to one isolated person, it 
would make sense to refer to this level of analysis as suprapersonal. And yet it is also 
the case that in social interaction our bodies are physically entrained on what we 
might call the subpersonal level, and these dynamics influence events on the person-
al level from the bottom up. 
Evidently, there is currently a great confusion of terms in cognitive science, but this is 
only natural given that it is such an interdisciplinary melting pot. Hume had it much 
easier in this respect since he only had to be consistent with himself. I think that the 
enactive approach has a rather healthy response to this complex situation by avoid-
ing the premature imposition of any rigid hierarchies onto the different phenomena 
that we can distinguish. Indeed, instead of trying to place these phenomena on sepa-
rate scales and levels ranging from above-personal to below-personal, from self-per-
sonal to other-personal, and from self-conscious to unconscious, it may be more 
helpful to think of a network of various phenomena. And, come to think of it, didn’t 
Hume already say that the self is a bundle or collection of perceptions?
If you had a chance to ask or argue with Hume about anything, what would it 
be? 
I would take the opportunity to thank him for his outstanding contributions to the gen-
eral philosophical toolkit that we can all use in order to improve the way we think and 
live. Of course, I would also be delighted if we could debate the finer points of the en-
active approach to cognitive science together.94 AVANT  Volume II, Number 1/2011   www.avant.edu.pl
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